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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A HEALTHFUL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Mary Ellen Cusack' 
What is pure water? .... If 'natural' refers to 'nature' are we to let 
it proceed without intervention in regard to floods . ... What is beauty? 
.... What is clean air?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each time we hear news of an oil spill destroying marine life and 
vegetation or read another warning about the depleting ozone layer, 
it reminds us of the importance of preserving our environment. 
Nevertheless, these events seem far removed from our daily life, 
not requiring our immediate attention. Our lack of concern changes 
drastically when the environmental hazards enter our own commu-
nities .. Perhaps the threat arrives in the form of a nearby sanitary 
landfill or a nuclear power plant. Maybe the morning newspaper has 
announced plans for the construction of a new local shopping center. 
Whatever the scenario, the potential for environmental harm and 
the reSUlting endangerment to our own health and well-being sud-
denly becomes real. Yet, we often lack legal recourse against these 
threats. Our interests in breathing clean air, drinking clean water, 
and enjoying a natural, unblemished environment are affected pro-
foundly, perhaps irreparably. Although ensuring the health and 
safety of our environment is of fundamental importance, the impor-
tance of an interest does not necessarily make a "fundamental" right, 
• Production Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886, 896-97 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1973) (citing Allegheny County v. United States Steel Corp. at No. 1550 (April 
term, 1972)). 
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at least not in the constitutional sense. 2 For courts to accord consti-
tutional protection to a fundamental right, that right must either be 
explicitly or implicitly stated within our federal or state constitution. 3 
Congress has entertained proposals for an amendment to the 
United States Constitution recognizing the right to a healthful en-
vironment on two occasions, in 1968 and 1970.4 Both attempts at 
amendment were unsuccessful. Undaunted, environmental groups 
sued in federal court, asserting that the right to a healthful environ-
ment should be recognized under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or within the penumbra5 of the 
Ninth Amendment. 6 Like the attempted constitutional amendments, 
the suits failed to achieve recognition of this right, although some 
courts did acknowledge the environment's importance and the future 
possibility of constitutional environmental protection. 7 
In contrast to the reluctance of the federal legislature and judiciary 
to expand their interpretation of fundamental rights, individual 
states have recently begun to increase their recognition of such 
rights and liberties. 8 Environmental issues in particular have been 
at the forefront of state constitutional reform. 9 State legislatures 
and judiciaries have been much more willing than their federal coun-
terparts to create and enforce a constitutional right to a clean en-
vironment. 
This Comment argues that a state constitutional right to a health-
ful environment could serve as a valuable source of protection for 
individuals' health and well-being. Ideally, our federal government 
should recognize a constitutional right to a healthful environment. 
2 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). 
3Id. at 33-34. 
4 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R.J. Res. 321, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1968). 
5 Legal writers commonly use the term "penumbra" to refer to those rights, not explicitly 
stated, that stem from or arise out of rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See 
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984) ("The 'penumbra' was no 
more than a perception that it is sometimes necessary to protect actions or associations not 
guaranteed by the Constitution in order to protect an activity that is. "). 
6 See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps 
of Eng'r of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
7 Envtl. Defense Fund, 325 F. Supp. 728. "Such claims, even under our present Constitution, 
are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one way or another, obtain judicial recognition." 
Id. at 739. See also Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (N.D. W. Va. 
1973). 
8 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 
13 VT. L. REV. 11, 11 (1988-89). 
9 Robert A. McLaren, Environmental Protection Based on State Constitutional Law: A 
Call For Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123, 126 (1990). 
1993] STATE CONSTITUTIONS 175 
Concentrating on state rights, however, may be more successful in 
the immediate future. The reasons are two-fold. Federal environ-
mental legislation emphasizes the role of the states in implementing 
and overseeing various programs. 10 States are also more familiar 
with their regional environment and are therefore better suited to 
adjudicate related issues. In those states that have taken the initia-
tive in acknowledging individual rights to a healthful environment, 
the constitutional provision usually falls within one of four identifi-
able types: provisions granting citizens the right to a healthful en-
vironment; public policy statements concerning the preservation of 
natural resources; financial provisions for environmental programs; 
or clauses that restrict the environmental prerogatives of state leg-
islatures. 11 This Comment focuses on those states whose constitu-
tions expressly grant individuals a right to a healthful environment, 
and argues that the value of recognition far outweighs any problems 
of implementation. 
Looking first at the federal arena, Section II of this Comment 
describes both the past attempts to enact a federal constitutional 
amendment recognizing the right to a healthful environment and the 
relevant cases subsequently brought in the federal circuits. Section 
III examines the initiatives of individual states to grant more pro-
tection for individual liberties than is provided for under the federal 
constitution. In Section IV, this Comment analyzes state constitu-
tional provisions recognizing the right to a healthful environment 
and the cases involved with the assertion of rights under these 
provisions. Finally, Section V suggests principles to guide states in 
formulating their own constitutional rights to a healthful environ-
ment. 
II. THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR A FEDERAL RIGHT TO A 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
More than twenty years ago, Senator Gaylord Nelson first pro-
posed an amendment to the United States Constitution that would 
10 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1376 (1988). See also Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 267 
n.16 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Consistent with Congress' recognition of the primary role of the States 
in controlling air pollution, the [Clean Air Act] Amendments leave all such decisions to the 
states .... "); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection 
Agency, 859 F.2d 156, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Industry's reading of the legislative history 
focuses broadly on Congress' intent that the States play the primary role in administering the 
[Clean Water] Act. As to that general proposition there can be no reasonable doubt."). 
11 See McLaren, supra note 9, at 128. 
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recognize an individual right to a "decent" environment. 12 Two years 
later, Representative Richard Ottinger made a second, more com-
prehensive attempt at federal recognition of such an environmental 
right. 13 Although both proposals were unsuccessful, they brought 
the issue of environmental protection into the federal arena. In the 
years that followed, environmental groups made numerous efforts 
to effect judicial recognition of a fundamental right to a healthful 
environment. 14 Although a few courts supported the assertion that 
the right to a healthful environment is fundamental, they refused to 
grant this right constitutional protection without corresponding leg-
islation or United States Supreme Court recognition. 15 More than 
one opinion quoted Judge Learned Hand: "[n]or is it desirable for a 
lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating 
a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is 
distant. "16 
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit first recognized an environmental group as a plain-
tiff. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,17 the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged a decision by the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to cancel the registration for the pesticide DDT 
and thereby effectively loosen restrictions on its use. IS Under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the 
12 H.R.J. Res. 1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The brief proposal simply stated that 
"[e]very person has the inalienable right to a decent environment. The United States and 
every State shall guarantee this right." [d. 
13 H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The proposed amendment declared: 
[d. 
SEC. 1. The right of the people to clean air, pure water, freedom from excessive and 
unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic qualities of their 
environment shall not be abridged. 
SEC. 2. The Congress shall, within three years after the enactment of this article, 
and within every subsequent term of ten years or lesser term as the Congress may 
determine, and in such a manner as they shall by law direct, cause to be made an 
inventory of the natural, scenic, esthetic and historic resources of the United States 
with their state of preservation, and to provide for their protection as a matter of 
national purpose. 
SEC. 3. No Federal or State agency, body, or authority shall be authorized to exercise 
the power of condemnation, or undertake any public work, issue any permit, license, 
or concession, make any rule, execute any management policy or other official act 
which adversely affects the people's heritage of natural resources and natural 
beauty .... 
14 See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps. 
of Eng'r of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
15 See, e.g., Ely, 451 F.2d at 1139; Environmental Defense Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 738-39. 
16 Spector Motor Servo Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944). 
17 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
18 [d. at 1096. 
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right of review is available to any party adversely affected by an 
order. 19 The EDF contended that the widespread use of DDT would 
adversely affect humans. 2o The court held that the EDF's allegation 
of threatened biological harm to people and other living creatures as 
a result of the Secretary's action was sufficient injury to satisfy 
standing requirements. 21 
Buoyed by this initial success, the EDF then sought to enjoin 
construction of a government-approved dam across the Cossatot 
River, demanding that the river remain free-flowing. 22 In Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 23 
the EDF contended that the right to live in an environment that 
preserves the quality of life is constitutionally protected by the Fifth, 
Fourteenth, and Ninth Amendments.24 The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas stated that it was not 
insensitive to the EDF's argument and acknowledged that the EDF's 
claim eventually could obtain judicial recognition. However, relying 
on the current state of constitutional law, the court refused to extend 
such recognition, preferring to leave decisions on this issue to the 
legislative and executive branches of government. 25 
Subsequent decisions have followed the same line of reasoning. In 
Ely v. Velde,26 area residents sought an injunction to prohibit the 
construction of a prison in an historical neighborhood. 27 The peti-
tioners asserted a constitutional right to protection from unreason-
able environmental degradation and destruction in their neighbor-
hood.28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
declined to grant constitutional protection, stating that the petition-
ers did not present a convincing case for according judicial sanction 
to an environmental right.29 As in the previous cases, this court 
based its decision on the lack of past precedent recognizing a right 
to a healthful environment. 30 
19 See 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1988). 
20 Hardin, 428 F.2d at 1096. 
21 Id. at 1097. 
22 Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'r of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 730 
(E.D. Ark. 1971). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 739. 
25 Id. 
26 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
27 I d. at 1132. 
28 Id. at 1139. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Hagedorn v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (N.D. W. Va. 1973). 
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Tanner v. Armco Steel COrp.31 is one of the only federal cases in 
which a court gave additional reasons, beyond lack of precedent, for 
declining to recognize the right to a healthful environment as con-
stitutionally protected. 32 The plaintiffs in Tanner brought an action 
to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained from air pollution 
caused by the defendant corporation's chemical refineries. 33 The 
plaintiffs based their constitutional claim on the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 34 Like the courts in previous cases, the district 
court in Tanner refused to recognize a healthful environment as one 
of the rights protected under the Ninth Amendment, believing that 
to do so would be a judicial usurpation of legislative power. 35 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, stating four specific reasons. 36 First, the court found no evi-
dence in the Fourteenth Amendment's words, origin, or history 
supporting the recognition of environmental rights. 37 Second, ac-
cording to the court, neither the Fourteenth Amendment, nor any 
of the rights incorporated into it, provides standards to guide the 
court in determining when a party has infringed the asserted envi-
ronmental rights.38 Third, the court reasoned that the judicial pro-
cess is ill-suited to solving environmental problems; rather, the court 
believed the legislature is the more appropriate branch of govern-
ment to recognize individual rights under the federal constitution. 39 
Finally, the court believed that the tort of nuisance provided suffi-
cient remedies for environmental claims like the plaintiffs'. 40 
31 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
32 [d. at 535. 
33 [d. at 534. 
34 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). See id. at 534. 
35 Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 535. The court stated that 
[d. 
"[t]he parties have cited and the Court has found no reported cases in which the 
Ninth Amendment has been construed to embrace the rights here asserted. Such a 
construction would be ahistorical and would represent essentially a policy decision. 
In effect, plaintiffs invite this court to enact a law. Since our system reserves to the 
legislative branch the task of legislating, this Court must decline the invitation. The 
Ninth Amendment through its 'penumbra' or otherwise, embodies no legally ascer-
tainable right to a healthful environment." 
36 See id. at 536-37. 
37 [d. at 536. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. at 537. The common law action of nuisance is the oldest and. most frequently used 
basis for environmental claims. To obtain relief, however, the aggrieved party must be able 
to prove an injury to a property interest. In many environmental cases, this may be difficult, 
if not impossible, to prove. See John Y. Pearson, Jr., Toward a Constitutionally Protected 
Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458, 458 n.3 (1970). 
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In every subsequent federal case in which plaintiffs asserted the 
right to a healthful environment, the court dismissed the claim using 
the precedents of these earlier cases. 41 While the lower federal courts 
have been loathe to recognize a constitutional right to a healthful 
environment without Supreme Court precedent or legislative sup-
port, these courts nonetheless anticipate that this right will even-
tually achieve constitutional status. 42 In contrast to the reluctance 
of the federal courts and legislature, some state legislatures have 
drafted constitutional provisions acknowledging the importance of 
the environment and granting individuals the right to a healthful 
environment. 
III. THE INCREASE IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
States are not limited to recognizing only those rights explicitly 
provided for under the federal constitution. 43 The standard for fed-
eral protection of individual rights is meant as a minimum level that 
states must honor but may exceed provided their actions do not 
conflict with federal law. 44 Consequently, state courts increasingly 
have relied on their own state constitutions to protect individual 
rights and liberties. 45 A study begun in 1985 has found that more 
than four hundred fifty state supreme court decisions have inter-
preted their state constitutions to afford more individual rights than 
those included in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
41 See, e.g., In Re Agent Orange, 475 F. Supp. 928,934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (no constitutional 
right to be free from allegedly toxic chemicals used in agricultural sprays); Hawthorne Envtl. 
Preservation Ass'n v. Colman, 417 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd 551 F.2d 1055 
(5th Cir. 1977) (injunction granted against construction of highway bypass solely on grounds 
of alleged statutory violations even though the statutory rights did not reach level of consti-
tutional rights); Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 
1974) (constitutional claims of landowners seeking to enjoin construction of nearby shopping 
mall without merit). 
42 See Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1430 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Agent Orange, 475 
F. Supp. at 934. 
43 The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[tlhe powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
44 See Note, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 
1334 (1982). Federal courts will not review state court decisions as long as those decisions 
rest on independent and adequate state grounds. See David A. Schlueter, Judicial Federalism 
and Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1984). The federal courts' self-imposed rule is honored out of 
respect for state sovereignty and the reluctance of federal courts to publish non-binding, 
advisory opinions. See id. at 1084. 
45 See Brennan, supra note 8, at 11. 
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ment.46 Dubbing this trend the "new federalism," many legal scholars 
believe the renewed interest in state constitutions as protectors of 
individual rights is a reaction to the conservative stance of the 
Burger and Rehnquist CourtS. 47 For example, while the Supreme 
Court has held that there is no fundamental right to an education,48 
at least nine states have recognized such a right.49 Similarly, states 
have granted broader protection to privacy rights50 and expanded 
individual rights in the criminal context. 51 
The state courts' expanding interpretation of individual rights 
accompanied an increase in the adoption of state constitutional 
amendments. 52 Within the past thirty years, many states have re-
vised their constitutions in whole or in part. 53 States have been more 
successful at amending their constitutions than the federal govern-
ment for several reasons. It is easier to form a consensus at the 
state level, where interests tend to be similar, than at the national 
level where many regions have competing interests. 54 Moreover, 
enacting a state amendment is often easier. Usually, a majority in 
both legislative houses makes the proposal, and a majority vote in a 
popular election ratifies it. 55 In contrast, federal amendments require 
the approval of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-
46 See Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 
1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 
317 (1986); see also David Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A 
State's Version of Equal Protection, 13 VT. L. REV. 221, 221 (1988); Robert F. Utter, State 
Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is 
There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 27 (1989). 
47 See Utter, supra note 46, at 29 ("[a]fter the consequent period of relative dormancy of 
state constitutional rights, in the late 1970s and 1980s state courts began to reaffirm their 
traditional function as the primary protectors and interpreters of those rights."); see also 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions 
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533, 548 (1986). Brennan stated that 
"[n]ow, the diminution of federal scrutiny and protection out of purported deference to the 
states mandates the assumption of a more responsible state court role. And state courts have 
taken seriously their obligations as co-equal guardians of civil rights and liberties." Id. 
48 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
49 See Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Protecting Individual Rights, 8 
N. ILL. L. REV. 651, 654 (1988). See, e.g., Horton v. Miskell, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); 
Shoftstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 468 
(Mich. 1972). 
50 See Mosk, supra note 49, at 653. 
51 See Schlueter, supra note 44, at 1105-12. For a more in-depth discussion of the "new 
federalism," see generally Note, supra note 44 (note examines states' initiatives to grant 
broader protection to fundamental rights and liberties). 
52 See McLaren, supra note 9, at 126. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 127. 
55 See Note, supra note 44, at 1353-54. 
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quarters of the state representative bodies. 56 The United States has 
ratified only twenty-six amendments in the more than two-hundred-
year history of the Constitution. 
During this period of state constitutional reform and increased 
recognition of individual rights, societal awareness of environmental 
issues has also dramatically increased. 57 Consequently, a large num-
ber of states have chosen to grant increased constitutional recogni-
tion and protection to their natural resources, and the right to a safe 
and healthful environment. 58 In acknowledging the importance of a 
healthful environment, states have used four basic types of consti-
tutional amendments: those granting citizens the right to a healthful 
environment; public policy statements concerning preservation of 
natural resources; financial provisions for environmental programs; 
and clauses that restrict the environmental prerogatives of state 
legislatures. 59 
The first type of constitutional amendment recognizing a right to 
a healthful environment can be subdivided into three categories: self-
executing provisions that specifically grant the individual right and 
waive traditional barriers to standing; provisions that the judiciary 
has interpreted as self-executing; and non-self-executing provisions 
that require additional legislation before an individual can assert a 
claim.60 Seven state constitutions recognize individuals' right to a 
healthful environment, although the wording of the provision differs 
in each state. 61 The remainder of this Comment focuses on examining 
the courts' interpretation of these provisions and the different issues 
56 See u.s. CONST. art. v; see also Note, supra note 44, at 1353-54. 
57 See Victor M. Sher & Carol S. Hunting, Eroding The Landscape, Eroding the Laws: 
Congressional Exemption from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 435, 486 (1991). 
58 The following state constitutional amendments recognize the environment in some form, 
ranging from a policy statement acknowledging the importance of the environment, to a public 
trust doctrine regarding certain natural resources, to the granting of an individual right to a 
healthful environment: ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-7; CAL. CONST. art X, § 2, art. X(A), 
§§ 1--3 & art. XIV § 3; COLO. CONST. art XVIII, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; HAW. CONST. 
art. IX, § 8 & art. XI, §§ 1, 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; LA. CaNST. art. IX, § 1; MASS. 
CaNST. art. XCVII; MICH. CaNST. art. IV, § 54; MaNT. CaNST. art. IX, § 1; N.C. CaNST. 
art. XIV, § 5; N.M. CaNST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 4,5; OHIO CaNST. art. 
II, § 36; OR. CaNST. art. XIH, § 6; PA. CaNST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CaNST. art I, § 17; TENN. 
CaNST. art. XI, § 13; TEX. CaNST. art. XVI, § 59; UTAH CaNST. art. XVIII, § 1; VA. CaNST. 
art. XI, §§ 1-2. 
59 See McLaren, supra note 9, at 128. 
60 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CaNST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MASS. CaNST. art. 
XCVII; MONT. CaNST. art. II, § 3; N.Y. CaNST. art. XIV, § 5; PA. CaNST. art. I, § 27; R.I. 
CaNST. art. I, § 17. 
61 See id. 
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and problems courts have encountered when attempting to define 
the boundaries of this right. 
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO A 
HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT 
Plaintiffs' assertion of the right to a healthful environment raises 
a multitude of issues. A court must determine whether the consti-
tutional provision in question is "self-executing" -whether it grants 
the plaintiff a threshold level of standing absent accompanying leg-
islation. The court also must interpret the boundaries of the envi-
ronmental right-which causes of action can be asserted and against 
whom, the remedies available, and the level of proof needed to 
demonstrate injury or harm. In defining these boundaries, the court 
must determine exactly what constitutes a "healthful environment." 
Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Rhode Island have constitutional provisions recognizing an in-
dividual's right to a healthful environment. 62 An analysis of the 
relevant case law in these states reveals the various issues that the 
courts have addressed and the process through which they have 
defined the right to a healthful environment. 
A. Is The Provision Self-Executing? 
In cases involving the right to a healthful environment, a court's 
first inquiry concerns whether the constitutional provision invoked 
is "self-executing." A self-executing provision creates a legally en-
forceable right in and of itself; it does not require corresponding 
legislation to enable individuals to assert a claim based on the pro-
vision. 63 For example, the drafters of the Illinois Constitution antic-
ipated this question, and wrote the constitution with two sections 
on environmental rights.64 Section 1 of Article XI, sets forth a gen-
eral public policy regarding the environment and places a duty on 
the state and each of its citizens to maintain a healthful environ-
ment. 65 Section 2 explicitly grants individuals a right to a healthful 
62 Id. 
63 See 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 46 (1984) "A constitutional provision is self-
executing when it is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementing 
or enabling legislation." Id. 
64 See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1, § 2. 
66 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1. This section provides that "[tlhe public policy of the State and 
the duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of 
this and future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation 
and enforcement of this public policy." Id. 
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environment and allows them to enforce this right against the gov-
ernment or a private party.66 Similarly, the environmental provisions 
in the Hawaii67 and New Y ork68 constitutions are self-executing be-
cause they refer to individuals' right to enforce compliance without 
any further legislation. 
In states whose constitutions do not specify whether a provision 
is self-executing, the courts may make that determination. 69 Prob-
lems arise, however, when the constitutional provision directs the 
legislature to maintain actively a healthful environment for the peo-
ple but does not specifically state whether legislation is necessary 
before a party can sue to enforce the legislature's obligation.70 The 
Pennsylvania courts' first encounter with the self-execution issue 
66 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2. According to this section, "[elach person has the right to a 
healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against any party, governmental 
or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regu-
lation as the General Assembly may provide by law." I d. 
67 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. This section provides that "[elach person has the right to 
a clean and healthful environment, as defined by the laws relating to environmental quality, 
including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural re-
sources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through 
appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by 
law." Id. 
68 See N. Y. CONST., art. XIV, § 4. This section states that 
Id. 
[tlhe policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and 
scenic beauty and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural 
lands for the protection of food and other agricultural products. The legislature, in 
implementing this policy, shall include adequate provision for the abatement of air 
and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise, the protection of agri-
cultural lands, wetlands and shorelines, and the development and regulation of water 
resources. The legislature shall further provide for the acquisition of lands and 
waters, including improvements thereon and any interest therein, outside the forest 
preserve counties, and the dedication of properties so acquired or now owned, which 
because of their natural beauty, wilderness character, or geological, ecological or 
historical significance, shall be preserved and administered for the use and enjoyment 
of the people. Properties so dedicated shall constitute the state nature and historical 
preserve and they shall not be taken or otherwise disposed of except by law enacted 
by two successive regular sessions of the legislature. 
Section 5 further provides that "[al violation of any of the provisions of this article may be 
restrained at the suit of the people or, with the consent of the supreme court in appellate 
division, on notice to the attorney general at the suit of any citizen." N. Y. CONST., art. XIV, 
§ 5. 
69 See Commonwealth v. Nat'!. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc. 311 A.2d 588, 594 (Pa. 
1973). The court must decide whether the legislative intent is "to provide a presently effective 
rule, by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected and the duties imposed 
may be enforced without supplementary legislation." Student Gov't Ass'n of Louisiana State 
University v. Bd. of Supervisors, 264 So.2d 916, 919 (La. 1972). 
70 Linda J. Bozung, Resource Uses, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, at 151, 153 (P.L.I. Litig. & Admin. Practice Handbook Series No. H4-4963, 1985). 
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amply demonstrates the difficulties of interpreting such a constitu-
tional provision. 
In Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlejield,71 the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania brought an action to enjoin the construc-
tion of an observation tower near the historic Gettysburg Battlefield. 
The Commonwealth alleged that the proposed tower would spoil the 
area's natural and historic environment and thereby would violate 
section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution's Article 1. 72 Although 
the Commonwealth claimed that the provision was self-executing, 
the court disagreed. According to the court, section 27 was a general 
policy statement that served only to name the Commonwealth as 
the trustee of its own natural resources. 73 Consequently, the court 
explained, supplemental legislation was necessary to define the val-
ues mentioned in the provision and to establish guidelines to regulate 
competing uses of private property.74 Without this supplemental 
legislation, the court refused to hear claims invoked under section 
27 and dismissed the case on these grounds. 75 The strong dissent 
argued that the majority opinion emasculated the constitutional 
amendment. 76 
Ironically, the dissent in Gettysburg soon became the majority in 
Payne v. Kassab,77 which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided 
three years after Gettysburg.78 In Payne, the court held that section 
27 was a self-executing provision. 79 The Payne court did not explain 
why it diverged from the Gettysburg decision.80 Each Pennsylvania 
case after Payne followed it in declaring section 27 self-executing. 81 
71 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). 
72 [d. at 590. Section 27 states that 
[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations 
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 
PA. CONST. Art. 1, § 27. 
73 311 A.2d at 594. 
74 [d. at 595. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 596 (Jones, J., dissenting) The dissent explained that the court had "been given 
the opportunity to affirm the mandate of the public empowering the Commonwealth to prevent 
environmental abuses; instead, the Court has chosen to emasculate a constitutional amendment 
by declaring it not to be self-executing." [d. 
77 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
78 See id. at 272. 
79 [d. "No implementing legislation is needed to enunciate these broad purposes and establish 
these relationships; the amendment does so by its own ipse dixit." [d. 
80 See id. 
81 See, e.g., Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1304-05 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); 
Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 474 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
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Like section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the environmen-
tal provision in Montana's constitution does not explicitly refer to an 
individual's right to enforce the duty to maintain a healthful envi-
ronment. 82 While Montana courts have not directly decided the issue 
of whether the provision is self-executing, the dissent in Montana 
Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health & Environmental Sciences83 
acknowledged a party's standing to bring suit under this provision, 
although the court dismissed the claim for other reasons. 84 In that 
case, the Montana Wilderness Association sought to enjoin a pro-
posed subdivision development, asserting violations of section 3 and 
several state environmental statutes. 85 The Supreme Court of Mon-
tana found the statutes inapplicable to the named defendant and 
dismissed the case without mentioning the constitutional claim.86 In 
subsequent cases the Supreme Court of Montana has allowed claims 
asserted under this provision without discussing the self-execution 
issue.87 Thus, in two states, Pennsylvania and Montana, where the 
constitutional provision does not clearly indicate whether it is meant 
to be self-executing, the courts have interpreted the provision as 
allowing individuals to assert claims. 
The Massachusetts88 and Rhode Island89 constitutional provisions 
regarding the environment appear to fall within the last category-
82 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Montana provision declares that "[a]ll persons are born 
free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful 
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their 
lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, 
health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize 
corresponding responsibilities. " [d. 
B3 559 P.2d 1157 (Mont. 1976). 
84 [d. at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
85 [d. at 1158. 
86 [d. at 116l. 
87 See, e.g., Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1987); 
State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977). 
88 Article 49 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that 
[t]he people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and 
unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their 
environment; and the protection of the people in their right to conservation, devel-
opment and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural 
resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose. The general court shall have the 
power to enact legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights. 
MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLIX 
89 Section 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution's Article I states that 
[t]he people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery, and 
the privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under the 
charter and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore, 
the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along 
the shore; and they shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the 
natural resources of the state with due regard for the preservation of their values; 
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provisions granting citizens a right to a healthful environment but 
requiring enabling legislation to allow a person to bring suit. The 
Massachusetts provision specifically states that legislation is neces-
sary to protect the rights named in Article 49, and declares that 
preservation of the environment for the people is a public purpose. 90 
Similarly, the Rhode Island provision places a duty on the legislature 
to provide for conservation and protection of the environment on 
behalf of the state's residents. 91 No individual in either state has 
attempted to assert a private cause of action to enforce the right to 
a healthful environment using these provisions. 
B. Intended Parties 
A self-executing provision does not in and of itself give a party 
the right to raise a claim in state court.92 A state's constitutional 
provision can limit the class of potential parties. Four potential 
situations exist: private party vs. government, private party vs. 
private party, government vs. private party, government vs. gov-
ernment (for example, a conflict between two government agencies). 
Examining the text of each provision gives a preliminary indication 
of the parties whom the legislature intended to be the advocates for 
the rights that the provision grants. 93 For instance, the environmen-
tal rights provisions in the Illinois and Hawaii constitutions specifi-
cally recognize suits by and against private parties. 94 In M oiford v. 
Lensey COrp.,95 however, the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to 
apply that state's equivalent provision to a landlord/tenant dispute. 96 
The court denied the tenant's right to assert a constitutional claim 
when its common law claims were sufficient to remedy the alleged 
harm. 97 By reasoning that the legislature only intended the provision 
and it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation of 
the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the state, 
and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the natural environ-
ment of the people of the state by providing adequate resource planning for the 
control and regulation of the use of the natural resources of the state and for the 
preservation, regeneration and restoration of the natural environment of the state. 
R.1. CONST. art. 1, § 17. 
90 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
92 See Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1301 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). 
93 See ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 . 
.. See id. 
95 442 N.E.2d 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
96 [d. at 937; see also Fredman v. Clore, 301 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
fYl [d. 
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to protect persons and the environment from threats of pollutants, 
the court limited the applicability of the provision in other types of 
private suits. 98 
Some states' constitutional provisions regarding the environment 
do not explicitly authorize private suits. The Pennsylvania consti-
tutional provision, for example, is ambiguous on the question of 
whether a private party can bring suit or be sued. 99 Nonetheless, 
the Pennsylvania state courts have allowed private suits based on 
the provision. 10o The Montana provision also does not specifically 
state whether parties can sue private citizens. 101 The provision, how-
ever, does mandate that all persons have corresponding duties to 
respect others' right to a healthful environment, thus indicating that 
individuals have an obligation to maintain a healthful environment. 102 
Therefore private suits are likely to be allowed. 
The New York courts have yet to interpret that state's constitu-
tional provision on the environment to allow suits against private 
parties. Section 5 of the New York Constitution's Article 14 grants 
private citizens the right to enforce the environmental policy set 
forth in section 4, which places a duty to preserve and maintain the 
natural environment solely on the N ew York state government. 103 
As a result, private parties suing under the auspices of section 5 
have only asserted claims against government agencies or officials. 104 
In the majority of states with these constitutional provisions, 
courts seem more willing to entertain suits by and more often against 
government agencies. 105 For example, Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted standing to the state's Game Commission to challenge the 
98 [d. 
99 See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. 
100 See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263,272 (Pa. 1976) (suit against government official 
in individual capacity); Community College of Delaware County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 472 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (suit against community college). 
101 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
102 [d. 
103 N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 4-5. 
104 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Diamond, 349 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (action 
against Commissioner of Environmental Conservation seeking to void permit allowing con-
struction of sea wall along the Hudson River); Federated Conservationists of Westchester 
County, Inc. v. Reid, 377 N. Y.S.2d 380,382 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (action against Commissioner 
of State Department of Environmental Preservation seeking to annul granting of permit 
authorizing installation of stormwater drainage construction). 
105 See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 623 P.2d 431, 440-41 (Haw. 1981); State 
v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. 1976); 
People v. Pollution Control Board, 473 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Reid, 377 N. Y.S.2d 
at 382. 
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issuance of a solid waste permit for land adjacent to a waterfowl 
refuge. 106 The court provided that when a legislature invests an 
agency with certain responsibilities within a specified area of inter-
ests, that agency has the implicit power to be a litigant in suits 
touching upon those interests. 107 In this case, the Game Commission 
was the proper party to challenge a permit with potential adverse 
effects on a state wildlife refuge. 108 
Despite their apparent preference for governmental litigants, 109 
courts have not given free rein to any government agent asserting 
an environmental right. 110 For example, the Illinois Supreme Court 
refused to allow the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to prosecute cases before the state Pollution Control Board 
where the legislature had reserved that power for the State Attor-
ney General. III 
Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois and Pennsylvania, have rec-
ognized a municipality's right to bring suit under these constitutional 
provisions on behalf of its citizens. 112 In Pennsylvania, however, state 
courts were slow to interpret the commonwealth constitution's en-
vironmental rights provision as authorizing municipalities to be par-
ties. In Snelling v. Department of Transportation, 113 various parties, 
including the city of Allentown, brought suit under section 27 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution to challenge plans for the construction of 
a shopping mall and the expansion of a main road. 114 Allentown 
alleged that its citizens would suffer serious bodily harm due to 
increased traffic accidents. 115 The court ruled that a city had no 
standing to assert the claims of individual property owners. 116 Stras-
106 See Game Comm'n v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989). 
107 I d. at 816. 
108Id. 
109 See generally Life of the Land, 623 P.2d 431; Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136; Payne, 361 A.2d 
263; Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452; Reid, 377 N.Y.S.2d 380. 
110 See, e.g., Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983); People ex rel. Scott v. 
Briceland, 359 N.E.2d 149, 157 (Ill. 1977). 
111 See Scott, 359 N.E.2d at 157 (court refused to construe Article XI broadly to permit 
legislature to diminish Attorney General's power in representing state in proceedings designed 
to enforce environmental policy). 
112 See, e.g., Village of Hillside v. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Corp., 434 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1982); Village of Glencoe v. Metro. Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 320 N.E.2d 
524 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
113 366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). 
114 Id. at 1300. 
115Id. at 1301. 
116Id. Some individual citizens asserted the same claims, but the court denied them relief 
because their claims were too speculative. Id. at 1302. 
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burg Associates v. Newlin Township,117 also involved a town's at-
tempt to bring suit on behalf of its citizens. 118 Newlin Township 
challenged before the Environmental Hearing Board the Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources' (DER's) issuance of a sanitary 
landfill permit. 119 The board had recognized the town's standing, 
concluding that in suing on behalf of its citizens, the town was 
fulfilling its municipal responsibilities to provide for their well-
being.120 As in Snelling, however, the court refused to grant the 
town standing, on the grounds that there was no connection between 
the DER granting a landfill permit to a private company and the 
town carrying out its local governmental functions. 121 
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found a 
town's arguments more persuasive, in Franklin Township v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania. 122 Like the town in Newlin, Franklin 
Township sought judicial review of a landfill permit. 123 The court 
granted the town standing, reasoning that the town was a legal 
person with rights and responsibilities that included protecting the 
environment within its borders.124 Thus, in six years, the courts of 
Pennsylvania were persuaded that the interests of a town in pro-
tecting the health and welfare of its citizens were sufficient to garner 
standing under section 27. 
In sum, state courts prefer to have governmental bodies advocate 
the individual's right to a healthful environment. While courts have 
not hesitated to limit standing even for governmental plaintiffs, 125 
these cases demonstrate that government agencies or officials, on 
behalf of citizens, bring the majority of suits. 
C. Standing 
After making the initial determination of whether a party qualifies 
to sue, a court next examines whether the asserted interest is suf-
ficient to warrant standing. 126 The United States Supreme Court has 
117 415 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Commw. ct. 1980). 
118 [d. at 1016. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. at 1017. 
121 [d. 
122 452 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1982). 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 720. The court found that the town's interest in preventing toxic wastes from 
permeating its land was both direct and substantial. [d. at 720-21. 
125 See, e.g., Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983); People ex rel. Scott v. 
Briceland, 359 N.E.2d 149, 157 (Ill. 1977). 
126 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). 
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held that plaintiffs must allege an "injury in fact," and that this 
interest must fall within the zone of interests that the statute or 
constitutional provision in question protects. 127 State courts have 
differed in their interpretation of this standard. The Illinois legisla-
ture, for example, has directed the state's courts to interpret this 
standard broadly, exempting individuals suing under the Illinois 
constitutional provision on the environment from traditional standing 
criteria. l28 These state courts nonetheless still require that the al-
leged injury be real and substantial; an alleged apprehension or fear 
of injury is insufficient. 129 
Like the Illinois courts, the Hawaiian Supreme Court also inter-
preted the standing requirement under its state environmental pro-
vision broadly.130 In Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission,131 
the court granted standing to an environmental organization that 
was challenging the reclassification of certain lands, even though no 
members of the organization were adjacent landowners. 132 According 
to the court, if plaintiffs' based their claim on a constitutional right 
then they need only assert an "interest of justice" rather than a 
specific property interest, as a statutory or common law claim would 
normally require. 133 
In contrast, Pennsylvania courts demand a more substantial in-
jury, applying traditional standing criteria. l34 The Pennsylvania 
courts explicitly have rejected the broader standards that Illinois 
and Hawaii use. 135 For example, the commonwealth court in Com-
munity College of Delaware County v. FOX,136 the court refused to 
uphold the state Environmental Hearing Board's expansion of the 
127 Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Org. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). 
128 "Because the wrong here has reached crisis proportions and because it affects individuals 
in so fundamental a way, the Committee is of the view that the 'special injury' requirement 
for standing is particularly inappropriate and ought to be waived." Notes to ILL. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, (1970), ILL. REV. STAT. 
129 See, e.g., Village of Hillside V. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Corp., 434 N.E.2d 382, 390 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (in action challenging process of transferring waste permits, parties had 
to assert adverse or unsafe effect from defendant's actions, not merely disagree with process); 
Parsons V. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (in action seeking to enjoin state 
officials from constructing reservoir, parties had to assert more than fear of injury). 
130 Life of the Land V. Land Use Comm'n, 623 P.2d 431, 441 (Haw. 1981). 
131 623 P.2d 431 (Haw. 1981). 
132 Id. at 441. 
133 Id.; cf White Fence Farm, Inc. V. Land and Lakes Co., 424 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1981) (requiring property interest); Community College of Delaware County V. Fox, 342 A.2d 
468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (requiring property interest). 
134 See Fox, 342 A.2d at 474. 
135 Id. 
136Id. 
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class of litigants who could raise an environmental claim. 137 For a 
party to have standing in Pennsylvania, the court stated, the party 
must have a direct interest in the subject of the particular litigation, 
and that interest must be immediate and substantial, having a dis-
cernable effect. 138 
These cases demonstrate that state courts differ in their interpre-
tation of what constitutes sufficient interest to assert standing. When 
the state legislature's intent is unclear, state courts have tightened 
requirements for a party asserting a violation of the right to a 
healthful environment. 
D. Defining the Right and its Boundaries 
Having an interest sufficient to support a claim is only the plain-
tiff's first hurdle. The court next turns to whether the interest 
asserted requires protective intervention, usually in the form of an 
injunction. 139 In determining whether a private party or government 
agency has infringed on an individual's right to a healthful environ-
ment, the courts somehow must define "healthful" or "decent" or 
whatever term the state legislature has chosen to describe the 
right. 140 Only Hawaii's constitutional provision on the environment 
attempts to define "healthful" in its text.141 Section 9 of Article XI, 
directs Hawaii's courts to interpret "healthful" using the standards 
set in federal and state environmental quality laws. 142 The remaining 
states leave this determination with the courtS. 143 While some com-
mentators criticize the judicial definition approach, believing the 
courts are usurping the legislature's role,144 others have suggested 
137 [d. at 474. 
138 "[T]he requirement of a 'substantial' interest simply means that the individual's interest 
must have substance--there must be some discernable adverse effect to some interest other 
than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply with the law." William Penn 
Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 282 (Pa. 1975). 
139 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ill. 1975); Parsons 
v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
140 See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), afi'd, 361 A.2d 263 
(Pa. 1976) (court formulated three-part test to determine when right has been violated); State 
v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977) (court chose to balance competing interests to 
determine when right has been violated). 
141 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. 
142 See note 67 and accompanying text. 
143 See Bozung, supra note 70, at 160. 
144 Commonwealth v. Nat'1. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 593-94 (Pa. 
1973). 
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that "healthful" is equally as definable as "reasonable" or "fair"-
adjectives commonly defined by the judiciary. 145 
Courts' interpretations of the obligations set forth in the various 
state constitutional provisions regarding the environment essentially 
serve to define the boundaries of the right to a healthful environ-
ment. 146 In the majority of these cases, the plaintiff must prove that 
the provision places a duty on the state government to maintain a 
healthful environment, and that the government has violated this 
duty. 147 
For example, the constitutional provisions in Illinois148 and Rhode 
Island149 specifically place a duty on the state government to pre-
serve and maintain a healthful environment. Hawaii's150 and 
Montana's151 provisions, on the other hand, do not contain the word 
"duty." Montana's provision, however, may establish an even 
broader standard, seemingly placing the obligation to respect each 
individual's right to a healthful environment on all persons, individ-
uals and government actors alike. 152 While not using the word "duty," 
the Massachusetts,153 New York, 154 and Pennsylvania155 constitutions 
declare that conservation and protection of the environment is state 
public policy. 
Courts apply a variety of methods to determine whether the gov-
ernment has violated its obligation to maintain a healthful environ-
ment. These methods range from a specific mUlti-part test to a simple 
balancing of interests with no further guidelines for future cases. 156 
In Payne v. Kassab,157 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court enun-
145 Bozung, supra note 70 at 160; see also McLaren, supra note 9, at 136. McLaren notes 
that courts have not hesitated to interpret ambiguous terms in other areas of the law such as 
tort and federal constitutional law. [d. 
146 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976). 
147 See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 623 P.2d 431,441 (Haw. 1981); Payne, 
361 A.2d at 271; People v. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); 
Federated Conservationists of Westchester County, Inc. v. Reid, 377 N. Y. S.2d 380, 384 (N. Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1975). 
148 See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
149 See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
150 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. 
151 See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
152 [d. See also Montana Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 
(Mont. 1987) (Constitutional provision mandates that department protect public's right to 
healthful environment). 
153 See MASS. CONST. amend. art XLIX. 
154 See N. Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4. 
155 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
156 See, e.g., State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 
86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aJJ'd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
157 Payne, 312 A.2d at 94. 
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ciated a three-pronged test to apply in determining when a plaintiff 
is entitled to relief. 158 According to the commonwealth court, courts 
should consider whether there was compliance with applicable stat-
utes and regulations relevant to the protection of natural resources; 
whether the record demonstrates the defendant's reasonable efforts 
to keep the environmental damage to a minimum; and whether the 
harm resulting from the challenged decision or action clearly out-
weighs its benefits, and thus amounts to an abuse of discretion. 159 
This test places a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff.160 
In applying the Payne test, because of the plaintiff's heavy bur-
den, the majority of decisions have favored the defendant, who 
usually has been a government agency. 161 For example, Pennsylvania 
courts have concluded that section 27 of the commonwealth's consti-
tution does not shift the burden of investigating environmental harm 
to state agencies; these courts have concluded that the burden still 
rests with those applying for permits, provided the agencies fully 
satisfy their obligations under the Payne test. 162 Similarly, the Penn-
sylvania courts have also presumed the constitutionality of environ-
mental protection statutes, believing that the existence of the con-
stitutional provision further supports their validity. 163 
158 [d. 
159 [d. 
160 See McLaren, supra note 9, at 139. McLaren notes that while the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving the harm substantially outweighs the benefit, the state need only show compliance 
with all applicable statutes and regulations. 
161 See, e.g., Borough of Moosic v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 429 A.2d 1237, 1240 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (action to enjoin transfer of Pennsylvania Gas & Water Company 
property to private developer dismissed when plaintiffs could not prove transfer would effect 
utility's ability to provide safe and efficient water service); Community College of Delaware 
County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (adjacent landowners challenging 
issuance of sewage permit did not prevail where Department of Environmental Resources 
had followed all applicable statutes and actual construction of sewer lines would have negligible 
effect on water quality). 
162 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Envt!. Resources v. Precision Tube Co., 358 A.2d 137, 
140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); Pennsylvania Dep't of Envt!. Resources v. Pennsylvania Pub. 
Uti!. Comm'n., 335 A.2d 860,865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). Other Pennsylvania decisions have 
held that while § 27 does place an obligation on the state to consider the environmental effects 
of its decisions, it does not automatically designate or authorize the Department of Environ-
mental Resources to act as the sole trustee of the state's natural resources. Fox, 342 A.2d at 
482. See also Bruhin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 320 A.2d 907, 911 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1974) (§ 27 does not place primary responsibility of enforcing its provisions on Secretary of 
Environmental Resources). 
163 See Pennsylvania v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1370 (Pa. 1986). Judiciary 
has not extended deference in environmental matters to the executive branch of government 
in Pennsylvania, however, because the courts consider the legislature responsible for balancing 
environmental and societal concerns. Nat'l Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Casey, 600 
A.2d 260, 265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (governor's executive order limiting Department of 
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Illinois courts prefer to balance the competing interests involved 
in environmental claims in order to determine which party should 
prevail. 164 Here too, the balancing tends to favor the defending party, 
because courts are reluctant to issue injunctions except in extraor-
dinary circumstances. l65 Like Pennsylvania, Illinois has chosen to 
give wide latitude to the presumptive validity of legislative and 
agency actions concerning the environment. 166 
The New York and Montana courts have also applied a balancing 
test to claims brought under their environmental provisions. 167 In 
two Montana cases involving motor vehicle wrecking facilities, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that the courts must balance property 
rights with the environmental rights of the public. l68 Similarly, the 
New York Supreme Court has stated that giving proper considera-
tion to environmental interests may necessitate imposing a "social 
cost" in other areas. 169 While the court acknowledged that the en-
vironment's importance should not to be understated, the court also 
cautioned against ignoring the competing interests involved. 170 
States differ on whether their constitutional right to a healthful 
environment places an obligation on state legislative agencies to 
adopt uniform, statewide environmental regulations. For example, 
in Village oj Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board,l71 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court held that a manufacturer constructing an incin-
erator pursuant to a state government order must comply with local 
Environmental Resources' po-wers could not be justified under § 27 of Pennsylvania Consti-
tution). 
164 See, e.g., Village of Hillside v. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Co., 382 N.E.2d 382,390 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1982) (court balanced state's interest in disposing of solid waste against town's 
interest in stronger procedures for issuing permits); White Fence Farm, Inc. v. Land and 
Lakes Co., 424 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (court balanced state's interest in 
placing sanitary landfill against restaurant owners' right to healthful environment). 
166 See Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
166 See People v. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (court 
reversed board order that held statute prohibiting regulation of noise at sporting events to 
be unconstitutional, refusing to question legislative wisdom); Village of Glencoe v. Metro. 
Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 320 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (state regulation 
of waste into Lake Michigan presumed valid). 
167 See State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); Federated Conservationists of 
Westchester County, Inc. v. Reid, 377 N.Y.S.2d 380,384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
168 See Montana Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 
1987) (''While it is true that he does have certain constitutional rights to acquire and possess 
real and personal property, these property rights must be balanced with the rights of the 
public which the Department is mandated to protect."); see also Bernhard, 568 P.2d at 138. 
169 Reid, 377 N. Y.S.2d at 383. 
170 [d. 
171 553 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. 1990). 
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zoning laws. 172 In response to village residents' complaints of noxious 
odors emanating from a manufacturing plant, the owner obtained a 
permit to construct a hazardous waste incinerator. 173 The permit, 
however, required the manufacturer to construct the incinerator one 
hundred feet above ground, in violation of a local zoning ordinance. 174 
The village refused to grant the manufacturer's request for a vari-
ance.175 Bringing suit under section 1 of the Illinois Constitution's 
Article XI, the manufacturer claimed that the legislature intended 
the provision to mandate uniformity of environmental regulation; 
therefore iflocallaws conflicted, the statewide laws should prevail,176 
The court declared that while the intent behind section 1 is for the 
state General Assembly to playa leadership role in implementing a 
statewide plan for pollution control, the provision did not prohibit 
local governmental units from instituting zoning or environmental 
ordinances. 177 Pennsylvania, however, has interpreted its constitu-
tional provision to prohibit local governments from adopting zoning 
ordinances that would restrict or interfere with the operation of any 
state agency, including the Department of Environmental Re-
sources. 178 While parties must follow local zoning ordinances, state 
environmental regulations take precedence when state and local ac-
tions conflict. 179 Thus, states even conflict as to the pervasiveness of 
the duties imposed by the constitutional mandate. 
The majority of cases brought under these constitutional provi-
sions have concerned claims against government agencies. In gen-
eral, state courts hearing these claims have recognized that consti-
tutional provisions granting individuals a right to a healthful 
environment do place obligations on a state government to preserve 
and maintain the environment. In determining whether the govern-
ment has violated its duty, the courts balance the competing inter-
ests involved. This balancing more often reaches a result in the 
government's favor. So, despite the courts' interpreting these pro-
172 [d. at 366. 
173 [d. at 362-63. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. at 363. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. The court concluded that the General Assembly does not have a duty to adopt uniform, 
statewide standards for environmental protection. [d. at 366. See also City of Chicago v. 
Pollution Control Bd., 322 N.E.2d 11,14 (Ill. 1975); County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors 
Co., 408 N.E.2d 236, 237~8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
178 See Butler Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 513 
A.2d 508, 511 (1986). 
179 [d. 
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visions as expanding governmental duties to care for the environ-
ment, courts refrain from enforcing these obligations. Therefore, 
provisions granting individuals the right to a healthful environment 
do not provide the protection they supposedly guarantee. 
V. ENCOURAGING THE FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS TO A HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT 
Forming state constitutional rights to a healthful environment may 
serve as an innovative means of addressing society's emerging focus 
on preserving the environment for present and future generations. 
The establishment of a constitutional right is a necessary supplement 
to existing environmental legislation. Often, individuals must depend 
on government agencies, both federal and state, to seek out and 
punish those harming the environment. These agencies commonly 
are without sufficient staff or funding actively to pursue violators 
and enforce the applicable environmental regulations. 
Ideally, the federal government should recognize a constitutional 
right to a healthful environment. In light of the Supreme Court's 
increasingly conservative stance toward expanding interpretation of 
individual rights, it appears highly unlikely that the federal judiciary 
will acknowledge a right to a healthful environment. 18o Similarly, the 
possibility of passing a federal amendment to the Constitution is 
highly doubtful. 181 In contrast, state courts and legislatures have 
actively expanded their protection of fundamental rights and liber-
ties. 182 As a result, concentrating on state initiatives may be more 
successful in the near future. Although environmental provisions can 
take one of four forms,l83 those specifically granting an individual 
right to a healthful environment are the most beneficial because they 
can provide the greatest protection when courts respect legislative 
intent. 
A. Provisions Granting the Right to a Healthful Environment 
Should be Self-executing 
For a constitutional provision purporting to protect individuals' 
interest in a healthful environment to have any weight, it must 
180 See supra notes 46--51 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 54--56 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 45--51 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 57--59 and accompanying text. 
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specifically grant individuals an assertable right and be self-execut-
ing. In the seven state provisions examined in this Comment, only 
three specifically refer to an individual's right to enforcement with-
out supplementing legislation. 184 The remaining states have allowed 
the courts to decide the self-execution question, and when a legis-
lature's intent is unclear, the courts have encountered difficulty in 
determining whether the provision should be self-executing. 185 Penn-
sylvania's experience in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Bat-
tlefield,186 serves as an example of a court's difficulty. By adopting 
an amendment similar to the ones in Illinois,187 Hawaii,l88 or New 
York,189 Pennsylvania could have easily averted the waste of judicial 
resources spent on interpreting its constitutional provision. 190 
Without specific language, provisions granting the individual right 
to a healthful environment are often mistaken for policy state-
ments. 191 Courts are reluctant to enforce environmental policy pro-
visions where the legislature has not enacted any corresponding 
statutes. Therefore, policy statements do not grant an assertable 
"right", and the individual gains no additional protection than envi-
ronmental legislation provides. 192 Furthermore, to recognize an in-
dividual right and then require enabling legislation to enforce it, 
essentially subverts the intent behind the provision193-the legisla-
ture's possible inaction would nullify the right. 194 The 
Massachusetts195 and Rhode Island196 provisions provide an example. 
Though these provisions specifically recognize an individual's right 
to a healthful environment, the courts have not interpreted them to 
be self-.executing. Therefore, the supposed "right" is actually mean-
ingless. 
184 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 9. 
185 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
186 361 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). 
187 See ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2. 
188 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. 
189 See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 9. 
190 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
191 Commonwealth v. Nat'!. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 594-95 (Pa. 1973). 
192 McLaren, supra note 9, at 133. Policy statements in the form of a directive create "a 
legislative imperative, but unless the legislature chooses to enact an implementing law, no 
environmental right is created." Id. 
193 Mary Ann Barnard, Enabling and Implementing Legislation and State Constitutional 
Convention Committee Reports, 6 U.HAW. L.REV. 523, 529-30 (1984). 
194 McLaren, supra note 9, at 135. 
195 See MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLIX. 
196 See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
198 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20: 173 
B. Intended Parties Should Encompass Both Private and 
Public Entities 
Individuals should be able to assert the right to a healthful envi-
ronment against both private parties and the state gQ.vernment. If 
the legislature or courts enact standing requirements that are too 
stringent, it has the same effect of defeating the purpose of the 
provision. 197 In recognizing a fundamental right, the legislature ac-
knowledges the importance of that right. To limit the class of plain-
tiffs that can enforce the right would diminish the impact of recog-
nizing the right at all. For example, the Illinois legislature intended 
to broaden standing requirements so as to not discourage citizens 
from bringing suit. 198 The Illinois courts, however, have continued 
to apply a high standard to weigh a party's asserted interest,199 thus 
discouraging private citizens from filing claims. Despite the legisla-
tive intent that these rights be asserted by and for the individual, 
the courts consistently have limited the class of potential litigants, 
preferring governmental bodies as parties.200 Cases by or against 
government agencies or officials comprise the majority suits.201 This 
occurs even in states whose constitutional provisions authorize suits 
against private parties.202 Moreover, in cases against a private party, 
the plaintiff is often contesting a government agency action which 
benefitted that party.203 Therefore, the courts' preference for gov-
ernmental plaintiffs, and the indication from past cases that it is 
commonly a government agency's action in dispute, essentially re-
affirm the mistaken belief that the government is the only intended 
advocate and protector of the environment. Violating an individual's 
right to a healthful environment has the same effect whether the 
violator is a private citizen or a government agency. Determining 
whether the plaintiff has asserted a sufficient interest and whether 
another party violated that interest, appears no more difficult a task 
in private suits than in suits against the government. 204 
197 Barnard, supra note 193, at 5~0. 
198 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
200 See, e.g., Franklin Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 452 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1982); 
State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1977); Village of Hillside v. John Sexton Sand & 
Gravel Corp., 434 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
201 See supra notes 104-06. 
l!O2 See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27. See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 623 P.2d 431, 440-41 
(Haw. 1981); People v. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
l!O3 See, e.g., Village of Hillside, 434 N.E.2d at 384-85; White Fence Farm, Inc. v. Land 
and Lakes Co., 424 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
l!O( Compare Fox, 342 A.2d 468 with Borough of Moosic, 429 A.2d 1237. 
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Allowing claims by and against private parties would effectuate 
the legislature's intent behind the right. Some believe that as a 
consequence, courts would be inundated with cases. Courts have 
repeatedly stated, however, that legislatures are responsible for 
balancing the interests of society.205 Therefore, in passing such a 
provision on behalf of the individual, the legislature in question must 
have taken the potential increase of cases into account and concluded 
that the importance of recognizing the individual's right to a healthful 
environment outweighs any inconvenience to the courts. Also, many 
of these provisions allow legislatures to implement reasonable limi-
tations on the exercise of this right.206 For example, the Illinois 
legislature has enacted "exhaustive requirements" that only allow 
court claims after the plaintiff has utilized administrative proce-
dures. 207 Provided that these requirements are not so burdensome 
as to discourage plaintiffs from asserting claims, they would effec-
tuate the legislature's intent and not overburden the courts. 
C. Standing Requirements Should not be Unduly Strict 
Courts' interpretations of what constitutes a sufficient interest to 
warrant standing differ between states. Hawaii espouses a broad 
interpretation, allowing claims in the interest of justice rather than 
applying a high threshold standard208 and thus giving the greatest 
deference to the legislative intent underlying these constitutional 
provisions. Pennsylvania, however, has not expanded on traditional 
standing criteria, instead demanding a demonstrated substantial in-
terest before consenting to hear a claim based on the common-
wealth's constitutional provision. 209 Perhaps most problematic is the 
intrastate conflict in Illinois. While the Illinois legislature specifically 
has stated its desire to loosen standing requirements under its con-
stitutional provision regarding the environment, the state courts 
have not followed this directive. 210 The Illinois courts are intention-
ally limiting the number of cases they hear under these provisions, 
contrary to the intent of their state's legislature. Accordingly, the 
right to a healthful environment becomes less and less powerful, 
until it no longer serves to supplement existing environmental leg-
islation by providing additional protection for the individual. 
205 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettsyburg Battlefield, Inc., 311 A.2d 588,593-94 (Pa. 
1973). 
206 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
207 See ILL. REV. STAT. 1973, ch. 111-112, §§ 1031-1045 (1973). 
208 See supra notes 130~3 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra notes 134~8 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
200 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20: 173 
D. Defining the Right and its Boundaries 
The strength of these constitutional provisions granting the indi-
vidual a right to a healthful environment depends primarily on how 
the courts define "healthful", or whatever term the legislature has 
chosen. States may choose to adopt Hawaii's approach by defining 
the terminology within the provision itself.211 The legislature creat-
ing the provision may formulate a definition, or refer to the standards 
set by current environmental laws. If, however, the state prefers to 
leave the term ambiguous, then the courts assume the duty of defin-
ing the right. 212 Critics of this approach believe that courts have the 
potential to usurp the legislature's role. 213 Again, because the leg-
islative branch is responsible for balancing the interests of society, 
then it must be assumed that the state government considered this 
factor. 214 
Essentially, the courts' decisions in cases brought under these 
provisions serve to define the boundaries of the right to a healthful 
environment. The courts appear to agree universally that these 
provisions do place an obligation on state governments to consider 
the environmental effects of their decisions,215 although states differ 
in their interpretation of the extent of this duty.216 Some states also 
place obligations on private parties.217 The different approaches 
taken by state courts to define these obligations-and consequently 
to define the right itself-serve to limit the strength of the right. 
For example, the balancing approaches of Illinois and Montana ac-
knowledge the competing interests involved in environmental cases 
but do not necessarily give sufficient weight to the environmental 
interest. Similarly, Pennsylvania's three-pronged test weighs heav-
ily in the government's favor. In every case brought under section 
27 of the Pennsylvania constitution in which the government was a 
party, the court found in the government's favor, except for the one 
case that limited the environmental regulatory power of the execu-
tive branch.218 In the few cases finding for the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
usually has been a government agency or official. 219 Thus, the effect 
211 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. For the text of this provision, see supra note 63. 
212 See Bozung, supra note 70, at 160. 
213 Commonwealth v. Nat'l. Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 593-94 (Pa. 1973). 
214 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text. 
217 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
218 See Nat'l Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Casey, 600 A.2d 260,265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1991). 
219 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1371 (Pa. 1986) 
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of these cases is to define the individual's right to a healthful envi-
ronment very narrowly, giving overwhelming deference to legisla-
tive actions and essentially diminishing the substance of the right. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The strength of a constitutional provision recognizing an individ-
ual's right to a healthful environment depends primarily on the way 
courts dispose of the claims asserted under it. First, for the right to 
have any meaning, it should be self-executing. If the language of the 
provision lacks clarity, courts should interpret it to allow claims by 
individuals. This supports the intent of the legislature to protect the 
individual's right to a healthful environment. 
Furthermore, in hearing these claims, courts should refrain from 
limiting the class of potential litigants and imposing strict standing 
requirements. These actions subvert the intent of the provision and 
diminish its effectiveness. In addition, the difficulty the courts have 
had in defining "healthful environment" serves to reduce the provi-
sion's usefulness in protecting the environment. The ambiguity of 
the term, and the courts' reluctance to further define it, essentially 
reaffirm the status quo. The heavy burden placed on the plaintiff 
makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. 
Whether the few cases to date finding for the individual make the 
creation of a constitutional right to a healthful environment a worth-
while endeavor is questionable. If, however, the state legislatures 
and courts give more substance to this constitutional right, it could 
become a powerful tool in the struggle to preserve and maintain a 
healthful environment. 
(state prevailed on claims asserted against it); Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 322 N.E.2d 
11, 15 (Ill. 1975) (Pollution Control Board prevailed on charges against city). 
